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At the heart of mainstream International Relations (IR) scholarship today
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which the contemporary discipline understands the world and the historical
origins of the discipline in the world. For instance, today’s predominant
approaches to IR as a discipline and mode of foreign policy practice were
developed over the course of the early twentieth century and concretized
during the period of “sustained reflection about the organization of interna-
tional knowledge” that followed the Second World War.1 Key among the
global problems discussed by the European and American scholars and
public intellectuals engaged in these reflections was the postwar accelera-
tion of what David Armitage has called the “drawn-out transition from a
world of empires to a world of states.”2 And yet, reading mainstream IR
accounts of global politics today, one would never know that empire played
any role in these debates. Despite the centrality of imperialism, global hier-
archy, and transnational racialized cartographies to the founding of the
discipline—indeed, despite the fact that, as Armitage points out, most of
the world’s population “for most of history lived not in nation states but in
empires”—the dominant IR Weltanschauung to emerge from this period
naturalized an international terrain comprised almost entirely of discrete
sovereign states. From the beginning, this conceptual apparatus necessarily
occluded not only the lingering impact of race and imperialism on world
politics but also extant alternatives to its own political and topographical
knowledge.
Today, whether they are imagined by liberals as prone to cooperation,
by realists as inherently drawn toward power politics, or by constructivists
as responsive to international norms regimes, sovereign states remain the
primary units of analysis for much mainstream IR scholarship. Throughout
the field, scholars continue to naturalize this orientation by prospectively
narrowing the discipline’s interpretive frame to three dominant and accept-
ably state-oriented approaches—realism, liberalism (idealism), and con-
structivism. More importantly, for purposes of this essay, much of the
discipline also retroactively reads the contested landscape of world history
through these same, winnowing lenses. Liberals and idealists, for example,
frequently simplify the transition to an American-led, liberal order of states
after the Second World War, conveniently excising the impact of European
and American imperialism during that period.3 Realists, by contrast, insert
1 Nicolas Guilhot, After the Enlightenment: Political Realism and International Relations
in the Mid-Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 29.
2 David Armitage, Foundations of Modern International Thought (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2013), 13.
3 See, for instance, Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Idea That Is America (Basic Books, 2008)
and John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).
PAGE 132
132
................. 19416$ $CH7 01-10-20 15:22:53 PS
Morefield ✦ Crashing the Cathedral
modern sovereignty into world history by, in part, locating the “security
dilemma” in the writings of a selected canon of Western political philoso-
phers, namely, Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes.4 In both cases, main-
stream IR scholarship reads history in ways that make the world, in the
words of Slavoj Žižek, “become what it always was.”5
And yet, if the election of Donald Trump as president in 2016 clarified
anything in international relations, it is that this crabbed history no longer
suffices to explain either global politics or American foreign policy at the
beginning of the twenty-first century. Indeed, it may make it more difficult
for scholars to diagnose contemporary political developments. The problem
here is the uncomfortable family resemblance—in form if not in content—
between Trump’s version of international history and that of mainstream
IR. In other words, the story of American foreign policy and global leader-
ship since the Second World War, according to Trump, is one of altruism,
victimhood at the hands of grasping nations who have taken our generosity
for granted, and betrayal by weak leaders bent on “apologizing” to our
enemies.6 During and following the election, to “Make America Great
Again” meant making America “become what it always was”: marshal,
dominant, white, and envied. Because many IR scholars approach interna-
tional history through a similar desire to make the world conform to their
political and intellectual cosmologies, much mainstream analysis of
Trump’s foreign policy often descends into a deadlock between conflicting
visions of the past that can only produce a kind of baffled incomprehension
about politics in the present. For instance, in the months immediately fol-
lowing Trump’s election, IR scholars and public intellectuals in North
America—particularly those writing for crossover journals like Foreign
Affairs—expressed amazement at Trump’s inability to couch his foreign
policy in terms that cohered to any agreed upon approach for talking about
the relationship of the United States to the rest of the world. Some expressed
horror, for instance, at his refusal to endorse the American-led liberal world
order of states.7 Others bemoaned his apparent dismissal of the basic rules
of containment.8 From his threats to use nuclear weapons, to his explicitly
4 See Hans Morgenthau’s discussion of Thucydides, in particular, his insistence that the
“idea of interest is indeed of the essence of politics and is unaffected by the circumstances
of time and place.” Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 7th ed. (New York: McGraw
Hill, 2005), 10.
5 Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), 58.
6 Donald Trump, foreign policy speech, Youngstown, OH, August 15, 2016, https://
www.c-span.org/video/?413977–1/donald-trump-delivers-foreign-policy-address.
7 See, for instance, John Ikenberry’s, “The Plot Against American Foreign Policy,” For-
eign Affairs 96, no. 3 (2017).
8 Stephen Walt, “Why Trump Is Getting Away with Foreign Policy Insanity,” Foreign
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racist references to “shithole countries,” to his open affinity for the non-
democratically elected leaders of countries to which he had business ties,
Trump’s every word called into question consensus narratives of interna-
tional politics that had been dominant since the end of the Second World
War. Again and again, scholars responded by reiterating their own versions
of world politics and world history, often expressing utter dismay at
Trump’s inability to stick to the known script. The urgency of this collective
dismay is perhaps best captured in the 2018 words of former Secretary of
Defense, Ash Carter who, after viewing a Trump/Putin news conference,
likened the experience to “watching the destruction of a cathedral.”9
It is hardly surprising that in an era of clashing and mutually incompre-
hensible global histories, we would see a renaissance of scholarship com-
mitted to re-evaluating the history and “ideational scaffolding” of that
cathedral.10 The four books under consideration here do this in rigorous
and diverse ways. The time period interrogated collectively by these texts
ranges from the late nineteenth century to the late 1980s, with all four
overlapping in their coverage of the crucial two decades following the Sec-
ond World War. Rather than repeating what Robert Vitalis calls the disci-
pline’s “fables of origin,” these texts embrace the opportunity to reimagine
the role of intellectual history in international politics.11 They thus shift the
act of writing history away from justifying a world of sovereign states in
the present toward writing critical examinations of the past that, as Egle.
Rindzevičiūte. puts it, “enhance our reflexivity” by “revealing the specific
political and technical contexts that have generated our current interest into
ourselves.”12 Collectively, these counter-histories interrogate dominant
ideological trends, investigate forgotten schools of thought, reveal and re-
evaluate the utterances of public intellectuals, and re-stitch the frayed politi-
cal connections between intellectuals and governments that have been effec-
tively written out of IR’s “invented history.”13 When taken together, they
paint a far more complicated portrait of international relations over the
course of the twentieth century than either mainstream IR or its uncanny
Policy, July 18, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/18/why-trump-is-getting-away
-with-foreign-policy-insanity/.
9 CNN, “Former Intel Chiefs Condemn Trump’s News Conference With Putin,” July 17,
2018, http://m.cnn.com/en/article/h_8d38e5d3a43918785d86f23c92ba3fc4.
10 Robert Vitalis, White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American Inter-
national Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017), 58.
11 Vitalis, 6.
12 Egle. Rindzevičiūte., The Power of Systems: How Policy Sciences Opened Up the Cold
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Trumpian doppelgänger would care to admit, a portrait in which power
politics, racism, imperialism, ideology, and the military industrial complex
play a significant and troubling role in shaping our current world order.
All four books do this by employing two distinct but overlapping meth-
odological perspectives, one oriented toward exposure, the other toward
recovery. Nicolas Guilhot’s work, for example, seeks to expose the politi-
cal/philosophical underpinnings of that “elusive ideology” known as IR
realism by examining the cross currents of conservative and counter-
Enlightenment influences at work in its origins which have, for a variety of
reasons, become less detectable over time.14 The book is oriented toward
both tracing these currents and interrogating the discursive and political
developments that explain their occlusion. By contrast, Or Rosenboim and
Rindzevičiūte. have written works of recovery that seek to draw attention
to previously unnoticed groups of thinkers and policy makers who, none-
theless, influenced mid to late twentieth-century IR as a discipline and
helped shape ideas regarding international organization and global gover-
nance. Rosenboim does this by focusing on several particularly rich exam-
ples of the multiple controversies and debates about “globalism” that took
place among influential public intellectuals in the US and Europe during the
1940s. Rindzevičiūte.’s book is more explicitly transnational in its purview,
focusing on the heretofore ignored work of thinkers involved with the
International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in the 1970s
and 1980s who she treats as “conscious makers of a new world.”15 Finally,
Vitalis’s book brings both of these approaches together in a pincer grasp
that exposes the imperial and racial logic at the core of early twentieth-
century IR in America and recovers the largely forgotten writings of Black
scholars who wrote “about white world supremacy from the standpoint of
its victims.”16
In what follows, I explore each of these texts in more detail. As will
become obvious, they share certain similarities. Each author, for instance,
takes an expansive attitude to the role of public intellectuals in the con-
struction of twentieth-century international order and most of them are
concerned with the Eurocentric, anti-modernist, hierarchical, and anti-
democratic assumptions baked into those ideas of order. Rosenboim and
Vitalism share an interest in the ideological rejiggering of imagined geo-
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and historically “globalist” ideologies, and Guilhot and Rindzevičiūte. both
touch on the genealogical origins of global neoliberal governmentality.
Finally, all of these authors dwell somewhat on the complex relationship
between governments, think tanks, universities, and intellectuals that were
so central to the construction of today’s mainstream accounts of global
politics. This essay, however, is also concerned with the way these texts
complement each other and, when read together, flesh out each author’s
critical oversights and collectively tell a richly complex and troubled story
about the history of IR in the twentieth century. I end with some brief
thoughts on the political relevance of writing counter-international-history
in a “post-factual” era.
Vitalis, Rosenboim, Guilhot, and Rindzevičiūte. have all written books
that join an increasingly growing and vital body of scholarship sitting at
the intersection of intellectual history, political theory, and international
relations.17 In this spirit, each of these four authors approaches IR as a
polyvalent phenomenon; both an academic discipline, a mode of foreign
policy engagement, and a popularized vocabulary for describing the world.
In other words, rather than treat the historical emergence of IR as an
entirely scholarly—that is, as a discrete disciplinary object—these scholarly
books approach it as an evolving set of theories, practices, ideologies, poli-
cies, norms, and institutional networks developed over time by academics,
policy makers, and public intellectuals. With the exception of the thinkers
associated with the IIASA discussed by Rindzevičiūte., the disciplinary pre-
decessors under consideration usually had at least one foot in the American
and/or British academy and, often, another foot in the world of foreign
policy think tanks. These “intellectual middlemen”18 were involved in a
self-conscious process of world making, whether as “builders of Utopia”19
or its ostensible critics. Moreover, when looked at closely and in context,
the world organizing / world theorizing principles to emerge from the
pens of these influential thinkers were far more internally fraught than the
17 See for instance, John M. Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Jennifer Pitts, Boundaries of Interna-
tional Law and Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018); Patricia
Owen, Between War and Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); William
Hooker, Carl Schmitt’s International Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009); Adom Getachew, Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-
Determination (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019).
18 Vitalis, 4.
19 Or Rosenboim, The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World Order in Britain and
the United States, 1939–1950 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), 169.
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dominant narratives associated with the intellectual traditions of either IR
idealism or realism would suggest. Rather, the ideological infrastructure of
these visions often required complex internal maintenance and conceptual
maneuvering to rationalize, maintain, and/or obscure their political con-
tent. For example, as Guilhot notes, arguing that it is possible for a func-
tioning and secure global order to exist in the absence of central authority
actually required realists in the past (and contemporary neorealists and neo-
liberals today) to perform sophisticated rhetorical juggling acts that stealth-
ily re-infuse politics into putatively self-sustaining systems, often under the
cover of an “artfully maintained balance of power.”20
Guilhot begins After the Enlightenment: Political Realism and Interna-
tional Relations in the Mid-Twentieth Century by zeroing in on the political
and intellectual problem of letting those artfully maintained tensions go
undiagnosed within IR as a discipline. He devotes much of his introduction
to an examination of the contemporary intellectual movement to revivify
(or “re-enchant”) postwar realism. Scholars like William Scheuerman are,
Guilhot argues, motivated largely by the desire to find an approach to
global politics that both counters the flawed interventionist politics of the
last thirty years and also provides a genuinely political language capable of
responding to neoliberalism’s relentless reduction of the world to economic
rationality. As such, these “left realists” find inspiration in early realism’s
deep suspicion of nineteenth-century liberalism whose faith in rationality,
they argue, ends in an imperializing form of utopianism. In today’s
world—a world consumed by apolitical, neoliberal overreach and eco-
nomic rationality—classical realism, in Guilhot’s words, “seems to be the
only language left to impugn imperial adventurism” while still being taken
seriously in policy circles.21
The problem with this revivalist project, Guilhot continues, is that it
fails to adequately grasp the deeper political and ideological contradictions
within early realism that resonate—in complex, ideological ways—with
neoliberalism. The postwar realism developed by (largely) émigré scholars
like Hans Morgenthau was, indeed, a reaction against the totalitarian
impulses of the nineteenth-century liberal belief that economic ordering
would and ought to ultimately replace politics. But, as Guilhot argues, neo-
liberalism itself is similarly a reaction against nineteenth-century liberalism.
Classical realism and neoliberalism share a neo-Burkean rejection of the
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irrational, and a keen sense that liberalism could be saved only if it were
“submitted to a form of politics that was not liberal.”22 The turn to classical
realism as an antidote to neoliberalism and rational choice is thus ulti-
mately doomed to failure, argues Guilhot, because it refuses to acknowl-
edge those shared ideological commitments encircling the core of the two
movements.
Even more troubling, the contemporary “re-enchantment” of realism
fails, Guilhot continues, to adequately appreciate the compromise realists
eventually struck with the 1950s Cold War university in order to legitimize
IR as an emerging academic field, a compromise that found these thinkers
rushing straight into the arms of the very scientific revolution and faith in
rational choice they originally eschewed as potentially totalitarian. The
book makes this argument through chapters that unfold as a chronological
series of essays centered around both individual thinkers and schools of
thought. Along the way, each of these chapters also deals with some of the
particularly fraught ideological tensions that cluster around both classical
realism and in its neorealist offshoot.
Guilhot begins by examining the overwhelming obsession with power
politics of Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, Franz Neumann and other
émigré scholars, as well as their collective abhorrence of the romantic, lib-
eral, and utopian ideologies they believed could only resolve into authori-
tarianism. Guilhot’s fascinating analysis of these early thinkers focuses on
the way most of them were trained as jurists in Germany and brought to
their emerging analyses both a Schmittian legal positivism and a Burkean
suspicion of democracy, particularly in international relations. In Morgen-
thau’s words, “a democratically conducted foreign policy is of necessity a
bad foreign policy.”23 Guilhot goes on to chart the evolution of the dis-
cipline in America, paying close attention to the way its foundational
conservatism, its connections to theology, and its deep skepticism about
democracy and utopianism were ultimately transformed, first into an
invented “tradition” with fictive historical roots in Thucydides and Machi-
avelli and then into a science. Through a close, contextualized reading of
these thinkers, Guilhot examines how the desire of early realists to secure
IR within the developing firmament of political science (and within the con-
text of the Cold War university and its attendant bevy of think tanks)
moved realism closer to the scientific presumptions of systems analysis.





................. 19416$ $CH7 01-10-20 15:22:56 PS
Morefield ✦ Crashing the Cathedral
ultimately reconciled to science through Kuhn—in Guilhot’s words, Kuhn’s
paradigms played for political science a role similar to the film Forrest
Gump’s “cultural reconciliation of a divided nation”—is a masterful exam-
ple of the intellectual historian as political investigator.24
At the end of the day, Guilhot demonstrates that the deracinated, ratio-
nalist, systems-oriented, neorealist accommodation to the neoliberalism of
today has its roots in both the ideological discomforts of the classical real-
ists and in their own accommodation to Cold War science. He describes
neorealism as “decisionism with a vengeance: a doctrine of sovereignty that
equated power and rationality” that is unable to recognize “an outside of
politics in an all-encompassing system.”25 In his particularly important final
chapter, “The Americanization of Realism: Kenneth Waltz, the Security
Dilemma, and the Problem of Decision Making,” Guilhot expands on these
concerns by demonstrating how Waltz’s internally focused systems theory
finally brought realism within the fold of systems analysis by effectively
neutralizing democracy. While classical realists “insisted on curtailing lib-
eral democracy by insulating foreign policy decisions from the public,” he
argues, neorealism “saved democracy by making it inconsequential.”26 In
this brave new world, “the system” would regulate itself. Guilhot lays the
blame for this shift not only on neorealists like Waltz but also on the pur-
poseful failure of thinkers like Morgenthau to specify who (if not a demo-
cratic public) should make foreign policy decisions.
Guilhot’s book can thus be read as a complex counterweight to a
simplified version of history in which classical realism is fixed in locked
antithesis to the apolitical juggernaut of neoliberalism and systems theory.
Intellectual historians reading this book might crave a slightly more
nuanced definition of the “Enlightenment” itself but the absence of such an
engagement in no way detracts from the overall power of the argument
and, indeed, interrogating the variegated history of the term could easily
have sucked up all the oxygen in the room and detracted from Guilhot’s
more focused critique on the equally complex history of twentieth-century
anti-Enlightenment thought.27 More notably absent from Guilhot’s fine-




27 For good reason, the “Enlightenment” seems to come under perennial reconsideration
by intellectual historians, including Jonathan Israel in the pages of this journal. See Israel,
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on the emergence of postwar realism in America. From Guilhot’s perspec-
tive, the anti-Enlightenment tensions at work within classical realism
flowed directly from the reactions of postwar German émigré scholars to
the rise of fascism and the war in Europe (a fact that makes their reliance
on Schmitt all the more ironic). Moreover, Guilhot describes the security
interests of the 1950s university as entirely the product of a Cold War con-
text in which an economic fixation with scientific rationalism swallowed
up any and all international or transnational democratic alternatives, and
realism—devoid even of its historical and political content—became the
only robust alternative to totalitarianism. We get virtually nothing, from
this account, about the domestic context of Jim Crow race relations, the
emergence of the United States as an imperial power before the Second
World War, and the relationship between this global, racialized empire to
the emerging postwar discipline of IR. How to explain, from Guilhot’s per-
spective, that the vast majority of “realist” military deployments in the
world during the Cold War took place almost entirely in the global south
and the former colonized and de-colonizing world? Is America simply, as
Steven Walt and John Mearsheimer argue, “the luckiest great power in his-
tory”?28 Whither decolonization, imperialism, and looming theories of
“race war” in realist thought? These seem to be particularly important
omissions given the extensive role that imperialism played in fellow émigré
scholar Hannah Arendt’s critique of Enlightenment modernity in The Ori-
gins of Totalitarianism. Why, given Arendt’s concerns, would other émigré
scholars erase imperialism (recent and remote) from their theories? What
happened in the US during this period to convince Morgenthau, for
instance, that it was appropriate to call America a “status quo” rather than
an imperial power in Politics Among Nations despite its recent history of
continental and extra-continental expansion? And what, in the end, does
this tell us about the internal contradictions of realism both historically and
today?
The absence of race and imperialism in Guilhot’s extraordinary book
in no way undercuts what the book does well, but it does suggest that it
should appear alongside Robert Vitalis’s White World Order, Black Power
Politics: The Birth of American International Relations on any syllabus
dealing comprehensively with the twentieth-century history of IR in
America. While Vitalis’s book is not dedicated to an exposition of realism
in the American discipline per se, he does touch upon it and the manner in
28 John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior
U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 4 (2016), 72.
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which he analyzes the subject suggests much about the method he adopts
in the book more broadly. In contrast to Guilhot, Vitalis’s approach to the
emergence of something called “realism” casts a wide historical net, tracing
its resonances through the thought of those white social scientists whose
scholarship provided a rationale for America’s expansionist politics during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Vitalis argues that
nineteenth-century thinkers who made key contributions to the emerging
discipline of political science in America, such as George Stockings, lobbied
for “discipline building at home and civilization building abroad” by
embracing an explicitly evolutionist attitude toward political hierarchy
grounded in organic racial differences.29 During this period, he argues,
scholars working on problems of world politics began theorizing interna-
tional relations and interracial relations together through lenses familiar to
both nineteenth-century Social Darwinists and contemporary realists—
namely, the struggle for existence, the idea that might makes right, and the
survival of the fittest.
According to Vitalis, when an approach to international relations spe-
cifically identified as realism emerged in the 1930s, it carried this language
forward and it did so in a racialized and colonial context. In contrast to
mainstream accounts of the tradition’s founding, he maintains, the term
“realist” was not introduced to America by repentant Wilsonians or by any
of the major figures Guilhot identifies. Rather, Vitalis observes that “real-
ism” appeared for the first time, in italics, in two books written by histo-
rian, political theorist, and eugenicist Lothrop Stoddard in the early 1930s.
In both texts, this same man, who in the 1920s had proposed creating
racially separate and unequal representative institutions, argued that a
“realistic” approach to international politics must secure “Anglo-Saxon
hegemony” from the threat embodied by “the delusion of international
cooperation.”30 According to Stoddard, for American foreign policy
experts, the only reasonable response to the decline of Anglo-Saxon civiliza-
tion (portended by the rise of anti-colonial nationalism) was to become
“clear-sighted realists” who embraced a neo-Darwinian approach to com-
petition between races, nations, and Great Powers.31 And, Vitalis argues,
Stoddard was only one among many scholars during the 1930s who
believed that American IR ought to be concerned primarily with the rela-
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In this way, Vitalis draws our attention to the “vast gulf” between
“what appeared to matter in the professional study of international rela-
tions” in the 1930s and the “imaginary world that a Cold War cohort of
realists would begin to conjure a decade or so later” during the period
that Guilhot examines.32 These myths of origin fail to note that race and
imperialism remained absolutely central to international relations thinkers
who called themselves realists during 1930s. Perhaps even more impor-
tantly and more tragically, such histories fail to recognize, or even acknowl-
edge the existence of, the work of Black scholars such as W. E. B. Du Bois,
Alain Locke, and Merze Tate—the latter two part of what Vitalis calls “the
Howard School”—who were actively making critical connections between
race politics in the United States, IR (as theory and practice), and the threat
posed, in Locke’s words, by “the imperialist world powers, America
included.”33
In its essence, Vitalis’s goal in his book is the same a Guilhot’s: to take
the smooth skein of our flattened historical account of the discipline and
re-knot it, to complicate and contextualize the development of IR in ways
that challenge orthodoxies and, in the process, expose uncomfortable
truths. For Guilhot, these truths cluster around the tetchy affiliation
between classical realism and neo-Burkean rejections of democracy. Vitalis
is interested, by contrast, in the role played by race, imperialism, and decol-
onization in the development of both American foreign policy and the disci-
pline of IR from the late nineteenth century to the early 1960s, an endeavor
facilitated by his understanding of the field as a fungible ideological constel-
lation rather than a more or less coherent body of thought. On the one
hand, Vitalis cares about the development of IR as a discipline, acknowl-
edging that it is difficult for readers today to accept that our “academic
ancestors” once identified the “ ‘international’ in international relations”
with racialized conceptions of populations and an abiding concern with
colonial administration.34 But the book is clearly even more interested in
the historical development of IR not as a “cloistered world” but one which
radiates beyond the academy. Vitalis is drawn toward those “intellectual
middlemen” who skillfully translated academic discourse for a wider non-
academic audience, men like Stoddard whose work on race and culture, he
argues, played a similar opinion-shaping role to that of Samuel Hunting-
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insecurities and interdisciplinarity of the early field and examines how
scholars and public intellectuals often flailed around looking for areas of
expertise in which to ground the many-headed hydra of American IR as
it coalesced into a discipline: flitting from history to racial science, from
geography to colonial administration. In this manner, the book re-examines
those forgotten modes of scholarship and policy discourse that accompa-
nied the historical development of American power in the world.
Vitalis focuses the razor’s edge of his critique on “two combined myths
of IR” that continue to structure the discipline and practice of international
relations today: the conviction that the United States is not and has never
been an imperial power, and the belief that the discipline has never shown
much interest in the study of race and imperialism. The strength of this
willful ignorance—or as Vitalis beautifully puts it, the “norm against
noticing”—enables mainstream accounts of American IR to proceed:
(a) as if this imperial history never occurred, and,
(b) as if this interest in race and imperialism had no long term impact
on both the shape of American foreign policy and the intellectual
object that is IR today, and
(c) as if, until Michael Doyle wrote Empires, no one in IR showed any
interest in imperialism as an object of inquiry.
The book is structured chronologically and each chapter both analyzes the
actual presence of race and empire in IR’s discursive past (as well as the
practice of unseeing this past) and also critically re-engages the work of
those Black scholars who sought to trouble this emerging consensus. The
book thus exemplifies a dialectical attempt to reveal and recover at the
same time.
By critically reappraising the largely forgotten scholarship of Locke,
Ralph Bunch, Tate, and other scholars associated with the Howard School,
this book punches through what Vitalis calls the “virtual barrier” between
critical race studies and mainstream IR in America today.36 He tells a fasci-
nating and disturbing story of the way white social scientists in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth century first integrated the “Negro Problem” in
the South into their accounts of the emerging field. Equally fraught is the
story of how these accounts were nested within what Edward Said famously
called “imaginative geographies” that divided the world into populations
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its aspirational fringes (Indian Territory, Mexico, the Caribbean, and the
Pacific). But the story of how mainstream white IR (acting in collusion with
the Cold War university) blithely ignored these connections at the same
time Black scholars in America were actively making them, is simply shame-
ful. In a perfect world, Vitalis’s book would lead immediately to a cross-
disciplinary reengagement with, for instance, Tate’s prescient analyses of
American expansion in the Pacific and Dubois’s writings on race, imperial-
ism, and international politics.
Ironically, while Vitalis’s work has much to tell about myth construc-
tion and institution building in American IR, its sole focus on America
could itself be interpreted as slightly exceptionalist, a criticism one could
also make of Guilhot’s work. Guilhot and Vitalis have both written books
that are interested primarily in the responses of American (and/or émigré)
scholars to either the problems they believed flowed from an Enlightenment
faith in democracy or from America’s racial and imperial politics. As such,
these books concentrate almost exclusively on the American academy and
the Cold War networks that enabled a particular historical understanding
of the discipline to triumph in an American context. Even when Vitalis
addresses the Atlantic Charter, or the relationship between mainstream
American scholars and their UK equivalents, or notes the influence of larger
decolonization movements on the Howard School thinkers, the primary
debates, discussions, and instances of institutional king-making which he
interrogates all took place largely within an American academic environ-
ment or the broader policy world of American think tanks. This concentra-
tion on American foreign policy and the discipline of IR in the United States
makes sense given both the global influence of the American academy and,
more importantly, the extraordinary political, economic, and military
power wielded by the United States since the Second World War. Unsettling
the myths and delusions that undergird American IR thus plays an essential
role in challenging these particular constellations of power. What such an
account loses, however, is a sense of both the transnational forms of coop-
eration that went into the creation of today’s “international order” and
the extent to which both British and American intellectuals were actively
involved in theorizing the twentieth century’s transition from a system of
empires to a system of states through the emerging and ideologically unsta-
ble concept of “the global.”
Or Rosenboim’s The Emergence of Globalism: Visions of World Order
in Britain and the United States, 1939–1950 can, in this sense, serve as an
important supplement to both Guilhot’s and Vitalis’s histories. Her analy-
sis, for instance, expands on Vitalis’s critique of the assumption in academic
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IR that the “subject matter of international relations has forever been found
on one side of a geographic border between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘for-
eign.’ ”37 Vitalis makes this argument by exploring how IR scholars once
included the “Negro Problem” in the American South in their studies of
global politics.38 Those thinkers who played key roles in the formation of
the discipline in the first several decades of the twentieth century, he main-
tains, conceptualized international politics not merely as the relations
between states but, also, in terms of both “territorial and phenotypical
units” as well as analyses of “anthropo-geographical boundaries.”39 His
argument about this broader, racialized conception of borders, however,
stops short of addressing the ways geography and imagined forms of non-
state, imperially inspired space did not disappear from the horizon of a
mainstream discipline that—in its own fictional account of itself—was
always wedded to sovereignty and to the distinction between “domestic”
and “international” politics. Instead, as Rosenboim suggests, these con-
cepts continued to occupy the imaginations of both conservative and liberal
scholars of international politics during and after the Second World War.
Rosenboim’s book fills in some of the untold story about what happened
to “geographic” accounts of international politics after the war by tracing
them through the debates surrounding “unrealized plans” for a postwar
world order.40 For instance, her chapter on the thought of Owen Lattimore
and Nicholas Spykeman (who makes a few brief appearances in Vitalis’s
book) focuses on the use these thinkers made of “cartographic representa-
tions, geographic knowledge, and geopolitical concepts” in order to forge
a vision of world order that was “a response to the post-imperial age.”41 In
so doing, she provides us with a glimpse into the continued relevance (and
continued discomfort) created by the intersection between imperialism and
sovereignty well into the 1940s.
While Vitalis aims his recovery work at the marginalized and forgotten
tradition of Black IR scholarship on race and international politics, Rosen-
boim’s book delves into a number of mainstream but forgotten (largely
failed) efforts in Britain and America during the 1940s to reconceptualize
world order as globalism. In contrast to the discipline’s own myth of origin,
Rosenboim’s emphasis on the extraordinary range of intellectual efforts
that went into theorizing what were ultimately unfulfilled plans for a post-
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terrain upon which twentieth-century international relations evolved. At
the same time, the book highlights just how much these ideas about global
ordering were bound up with British and American anxieties about provid-
ing global politics with “an alternative to imperial relations.”42
Like Vitalis and Guilhot, Rosenboim organizes her book both chrono-
logically and topically. With these authors, she also writes about theories
of international relations after the war developed by public intellectuals
who often moved between the worlds of academia and policy think tanks.
The failure of these public intellectuals to transform their plans and debates
into settled schemes for international organizations and/or international
law has resulted in their near disappearance from mainstream accounts of
the discipline and the history of international politics in the twentieth cen-
tury. The result, for Rosenboim, is a collective scholarly failure to appreci-
ate the rich and ideologically tangled presence of “the global” in the
intellectual history of IR. This is true, Rosenboim argues, for both main-
stream accounts of the discipline and for critical reassessments (such as
those of Vitalis and Guilhot) that focus primarily on the “American history
of IR.”43
Rosenboim’s comprehensive and internally rich account of the 1940s
highlights two crucial points of ideological convergence at the fulcrum of
this postwar moment. First, there was considerable collaboration (alluded
to in Vitalis) between American and British intellectuals and think tanks
during this period, which suggests a form of imperial baton passing. Sec-
ond, the theorizing around world order to emerge from these collaborations
reflected the intellectual and political tensions that plagued both American
and British thinkers in the 1940s. In essence, many of these debates chan-
neled the collective desire of their participants to shore up a form of world
order that preserved the political and economic hegemony of Europe,
America, and the West without actually seeming imperial. At the same time,
Rosenboim’s reading of these debates suggests that those involved also
investigated a broad range of ideas regarding the status of democracy on
a global scale and were deeply conflicted about the relationship between
universal and pluralist approaches to order.
Unlike Vitalis and Guilhot, Rosenboim is less interested in telling a
cohesive story about the development of a discipline or set of ideas over
time. Rather, the strength of her book lies in its capacity to flesh out robust
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them. From examining these debates up close and in context, Rosenboim
draws out interesting observations about the political and intellectual con-
cerns of the people involved. All of these thinkers, British and American,
clearly worked under the assumption that the Second World War, decoloni-
zation, and the decline of the European empires created a power vacuum
on a global scale and that some system of global ordering must take its
place. Public intellectuals involved in these conversations mulled over a
variety of solutions and approaches, and, “in their quest for new conceptual
tools for the interpretation of international relations” found “inspiration
in other disciplines.”44 The plans themselves ranged from watered down
derivations of the British Empire (Lionel Curtis) to new schemes for eco-
nomic federalism (Barbara Wooten and Friedrich Hayek) to the creation of
a world constitution (Robert Hutchins). Moreover, these thinkers rooted
their theorizing in markedly different epistemological grounds, from partic-
ular perceptions of science (H. G. Wells) to the Catholic doctrine of the
human person (G. A. Borgese). At the same time, despite this diversity, the
overall picture that we get from Rosenboim’s portrayal of these thinkers is
that, for a sizeable group of incredibly well-funded and influential public
intellectuals in Britain and America, the question of “what happens after
imperialism?” could be answered only through a conceptual framework
that was both universal and committed to a hierarchically ordered world.
For all of the thinkers, a world inhabited by sovereign states relating to
each other in the absence of some deeper ordering principle—geographic,
spiritual, humanistic, legal—was unthinkable.
For Rosenboim, this is the moment when something we call “the
global” first emerged, and she does an excellent job of demonstrating—
throughout the book, in different iterations—how this idea often worked
to occlude its own internal incoherence. This incoherence, she argues, was
frequently the result of these thinkers’ wartime and postwar desire to align
whatever form of global order they were theorizing with a “political com-
mitment to assist liberalism in the cause against totalitarianism.”45 Totali-
tarianism, Rosenboim continues, functioned as a consistent, looming
“other” against which globalists could define their political agendas, often
in ways that seriously downplayed the ideological disagreements that
existed between them. Rosenboim also ably demonstrates the myriad ways
in which these putatively “global” responses to international political crises
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Western civilization. In terms that resonate with Guilhot’s analysis of real-
ism, many of the public intellectuals Rosenboim discusses oriented their
visions of global order “toward the preservation of the best of Western
civilization, as they defined it, from the menacing power of bourgeois liber-
alism, dictatorial totalitarianism, and communism.”46
Thus, despite differences between these thinkers, there was a streak of
conservatism inherent in the clear majority of their visions, a conservatism
apparent in their desire to retain and sustain liberal principles and a civiliza-
tional tradition that they failed to acknowledge was also deeply hierarchi-
cal, exclusive, and entirely Eurocentric. Despite the fact that most of them
were committed to making democracy a “global political principle,” these
“builders of utopia” never imagined that the plans for a postwar order they
theorized—however universal, pluralist, and democratic—would ever be
influenced by thinkers from the Global South and the formerly colonized
world.47 Rather, they relied on the deeply imperialist assumption that, even-
tually, with enough time and tutelage, formerly colonized people would
be able to join as equal and free members of a global community already
established by former colonial powers. The “global,” as Rosenboim’s anal-
ysis of these first forays into the concept demonstrates, was constrained
from the beginning by intellectual, cultural, political, and economic
assumptions carried over from precisely the imperial order that these think-
ers were ostensibly committed to replacing. By “attributing a global value
to a particular interpretation of humanity,” she maintains, globalists
“developed a range of implicit and explicit strategies to limit the space for
diversity within their proposed global order.”48
If there is one thing that would significantly enrich this excellent book,
it would be a brief examination of the long-term and contemporary impli-
cations of precisely this exclusionary historical framework (and the liberal
rigidity it implies). What, for instance, do close studies of these unsuccessful
liberal attempts to theorizing global order reveal to us about the successful
theory of liberal order that has been so mythologized in the work of con-
temporary liberal internationalists like John Ikenberry and Daniel Deud-
ney? By their reckoning, after the Second World War, liberal democratic
states (some of which happened also to be empires) “joined together” and
founded “an international order that reflected their shared interests.”49 As
46 Rosenboim, 269.
47 Rosenboim, 166, 169.
48 Rosenboim, 211.
49 Ikenberry and Daniel Deudney, “Liberal World: The Resilient Order,” Foreign Affairs
97, no. 4 (2018): 16.
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Ikenberry argues elsewhere, the process whereby America was appointed
leader of this new order occurred when these states simultaneously agreed
to transfer “the reins of power to Washington, just as Hobbes’s individuals
in the state of nature voluntarily construct and hand over power over to
the Leviathan.”50 Comprised of cooperating nation-states, Ikenberry and
Deudney maintain, the liberal world order may have originated in values
that first “emerged in the West” but these values have since “become uni-
versal.”51 Their blithe disregard for postcolonial history aside, how might
exploring the intellectual richness of the actual (rather than the mythologi-
cal) postwar debates described by Rosenboim alter this rose-tinted vision
of history and why does that matter? Does exposing the multiple ideas at
play in this moment suggest that the process of creating something we today
call the “liberal world order” was decidedly more contested and less liberal
than Ikenberry’s story of how, one day, multiple nations woke up in the
morning and decided spontaneously to nominate America to become, like
Caesar, the world’s “first citizen”?52 Or, are the implications of her analysis
even more damning? One is struck by how the conceptual assumptions in
Rosenboim’s descriptions of these failed plans mirror the most enduring
qualities of liberal internationalism today. Both schools of thought, for
example, are grounded in a faith in Western civilization and a singular
unwillingness to identify or acknowledge extant forms of federalism or cos-
mopolitanism put forth by scholars and leaders from the Global South.
Both appear simultaneously committed to and squeamish about interna-
tional democracy and they share a belief that some form of global liberalism
is the only bulwark against totalitarianism. Given these similarities, what
might a close examination of the deeply conflicted history of “globalism”
tell us, for instance, about liberal internationalism’s existential crisis in the
wake of the 2016 election? What might it add to the current spate of argu-
ments debunking the “myth” of liberal order?53
One also wonders what a close examination of these early debates
might tell us about the conflicted attitudes toward spontaneity, order, and
politics that clearly plagued so many postwar thinkers, liberals, and realists
alike. Guilhot confronts this discomfort head on by tracing family re-
semblances between the ideological content of classical realism and con-
temporary neoliberalism, particularly the shared fixation with imagining
50 Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan, 10.
51 Ikenberry and Deudney, “Liberal World,” 20, 18.
52 Ikenberry, “The Plot Against American Foreign Policy,” 2.
53 See for instance, Graham Allison, “The Myth of the Liberal Order,” Foreign Affairs
97, no. 4 (2018): 124–33; Patrick Porter, “A World Imagined: Nostalgia and the Liberal
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“individualized exchanges in the market as in international relations” as
an “infinity of interactions that took place in a space deprived of central
authority,” a space that resisted ordering and centralization. At the same
time, he maintains, both realists and neorealists insist that, despite the
absence of centralized authority, the space in which these spontaneous indi-
vidual exchanges take place require some form of political ordering which
cannot, ironically “be simply left to spontaneity.” Realist and neoliberal
order, Guilhot thus maintains, required an intricately constructed “frame-
work” that “had to be maintained through political means.”54 Guilhot’s
account here resonates most obviously with Rosenboim’s discussion of
Hayek’s similar attempt to theorize the global economy beyond states.
Thus, as Rosenboim describes it, Hayek’s “democratic federalism” also
coupled an epistemological aversion to planning with a permanent, ration-
alized framework “within which individual initiative would have the largest
possible scope and would be made to work as beneficently as possible.”55
But the similarities extend beyond Hayek who remains, after all, neoliberal-
ism’s most luminous ancestor. Rather, from Charles Merriam to Michael
Polanyi to David Mitrany, the various thinkers whose work sits at the core
of Rosenboim’s book actively debated the extent to which a global “order”
that was insulated from the potentially damaging influence of politics (and
democracy) could protect “liberty.” In other words, many of the thinkers
involved with these failed attempts were clearly envisioning a global system
that wasn’t constrained by politics but didn’t appear to be anti-democratic
or overly systematic. Given this tension, just as Guilhot cautions against
looking for solutions to neoliberalism in classical realism, what lessons
might critics of both neoliberalism and liberal internationalism today learn
from an examination of these early attempts to imagine order without
ordering, systems without systematizing?
Egle. Rindzevičiūte.’s The Power of Systems: How Policy Sciences
Opened Up the Cold War World is concerned precisely with this relation-
ship between politics and systems in global intellectual history. Her
approach to the material, however, is somewhat different from that of the
other authors analyzed here. The book explores the rise of what Rindzeviči-
ūte. refers to as “systems cybernetic governance” by carefully tracing the
institutional development of the heretofore ignored, International Institute
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) from its origins in in the 1960s
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through its heyday in the 1980s and the fall of the Soviet Union.56 Rindzevi-
čiūte. describes the systems approach developed by the IIASA as a “univer-
sal, non-political science of governance” that leans heavily on technology,
on the gathering of big data, and on identifying those complex, global prob-
lems that have become increasingly prominent in policy circles around the
world since the 1970s.57 Significantly indebted to Foucault’s theory of gov-
ernmentality to explain this mode of governance without government, Rin-
dzevičiūte. is also attentive to the not insignificant fact that Foucault
developed his theory precisely at a historical moment when the “systems
approach” was gaining prominence. “Indeed” she argues, “there might be
more than just a parallel” between Foucault’s historical exploration of a
developing “art of government” and the extant assertions of policy scien-
tists to have invented an “art of systems analysis.”58 Rindzevičiūte. also
notes the homologous evolution of this “non-political science of govern-
ment” with the rise of neoliberal modes of economic and managerial disci-
pline.59
The book, however, rejects typical historical analyses of the parallel
emergence of systems analysis and neoliberalism as too heavy handed. His-
torians of Cold War science, Rindzevičiūte. argues, have typically argued
that “operations research” and systems analysis were both developed by “a
sprawling evil empire of techno-scientific experts who eventually morphed
from being wizards of the Cold War military-industrial complex into
prophets of neoliberalism.”60 In this narrative, systems analysis overflows
its military banks to flood the civil sphere, gradually eroding democratic
approaches to planning and policy. Rindzevičiūte. does not deny the “colo-
nizing” capacity of systems governmentality but she challenges the high
modernist assumptions of the military narrative, arguing that this analysis
alone cannot explain the extent to which systems analysis was embraced by
both liberal states and non-liberal states alike. Yes, she argues, the systems
approach was indeed a Cold War phenomenon but it was also explicitly
(and somewhat counterintuitively) a transnational, non-military, and non-
governmental Cold War phenomenon. An analysis of the way the IIASA
approached systems, she maintains, enables us to grasp the complex organi-
zational and transnational efforts that went into the construction of the
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Rindzevičiūte.’s methodologically rich approach combines archival
research with interviews and ethnographic detail to paint a fascinating por-
trait of the policy landscape within the Soviet Union in the 1950s and
within the international culture of the “IIASA family.”61 The book interro-
gates how the changing strategic interests of the Soviets dovetailed with
both transformations taking place within American policy and planning
sciences and changes occurring in the Cold War geopolitical landscape.
Both “a symptom and a cause of the changing postwar governmentality,”
Rindzevičiūte. argues, the IIASA was created specifically to produce a politi-
cally neutral systems approach to policy.62 A truly international think tank
that included Soviet scientists from its inception, the IIASA served as a
transnational space for linking emerging modes of thought about policy
science, “a node,” as Rindzevičiūte. puts it “where loosely coupled networks
intersected, linking nascent global thinking with emerging policy sci-
ences.”63 Those chapters in which Rindzevičiūte. brings her closely wrought,
interdisciplinary sensibilities to an analysis of these communities and net-
works are some of the most fascinating in the book.
Perhaps the most powerful aspect of The Power of Systems is the ques-
tion it raises about the relationship between the history of ideas and the
shape of contemporary politics, a concern that also motivates this review
essay. All of the authors under consideration here believe that the history of
ideas matters, that writing counter-histories which highlight the intellectual
complexity of the past open up our contemporary horizons in ways that
allow us to reflect on the resonances of these original ideas and movements
and, in the process, to think differently about the present. But the authors’
various methodological commitments lead them to somewhat different con-
clusions about these resonances, particularly with regard to intention. Guil-
hot, for instance, believes it is a problem that contemporary left realists are
turning to classical realism as an antidote to neoliberalism without taking
into account the political resemblances between the two schools of thought.
It isn’t entirely clear from his book, however, if he thinks the presence of
anti-Enlightenment ideas within early realism necessarily vitiates the radical
possibilities of realism altogether or if these original intellectual intentions
are simply something of which contemporary realists ought to be aware.
By contrast, in her Foucauldian fashion, Rindzevičiūte. is very clear that the
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This line of inquiry is most apparent in Rindzevičiūte.’s extended inves-
tigations of those moments when the instrumental origins of systems analy-
sis (to produce policy outside of the Cold War political context) were
transformed into what she calls “policy argumentation” or the actual con-
struction of global problems that require redress.64 She focuses, in particu-
lar, on the transnational, East-West cooperation that went into the creation
of both the IIASA’s influential nuclear winter project and its report on acid
rain. For a variety of local and global reasons, these projects resonated
differently, and had different political consequences, but ultimately, the
transnationally produced computer modelling that went into their creations
helped draw attention to global problems that had not yet been identified.
They thus became sites for both cooptation and contestation that, among
other things, had an interesting and destabilizing influence on Soviet gov-
ernmentality. One cannot then, Rindzevičiūte. argues, draw an untroubled
line between the rise of global systems analysis and contemporary neoliber-
alism, because, as the example of the IIASA shows, “the liberalizing ef-
fects of system-cybernetic governmentality is always context specific.”65
Through the process of collaboration and creation, scientists involved in
the IIASA were sometimes able (as with the nuclear winter and acid rain
projects) to transcend the instrumental intentions of the IIASA itself. For
Rindzevičiūte., this means that “sources for critical thinking” can be found
not only at the margins or in practices of resistance but also within commu-
nities established by centralized forms of power.
There is a critique to be made that, in locating her account of resistance
in these deeply contextualized moments, Rindzevičiūte.’s book skirts issues
of coalition building, organization, and strategy. In other words, for those
activists and scholars who truly want to find political solutions to the depo-
liticizing steamroller of neoliberalism—including its fixation on systems
analysis and computer modelling—it might seem as facile to suggest that
we focus our inquiry on individualized examples of resistance from within
the systems community as it might be to suggest we locate solutions to
global warming in the spontaneous efforts of local organic farms. The ques-
tion is: at this historical moment, is enhanced “reflexivity” about the com-
plex “political and technical contexts that have generated our current
interest into ourselves” enough?
I argue that whether or not it is enough, “reflexivity” has an essential,
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the rise of Trumpianism and the xenophobic right in Europe and America.
Rindzevičiūte.’s project thus challenges hegemonic, historical accounts of
the Cold War, global policy making, and something now called “global
governance.” With the other books under consideration here, her historical
inquiry throws a wrench in the works of those disciplinary mythmakers
who respond to the global backlash against liberalism by doubling down
on their versions of how the world became “what it always was” and, in
the process, occlude political alternatives to the neoliberal status quo other
than totalitarianism. In this sense, just as Rosenboim points out the ways
postwar globalism’s “commitment to assist liberalism in the cause against
totalitarianism” restricted the space for diversity within its vision of global
order, so too do the contemporary responses of mainstream IR scholars to
Trump’s foreign policy narrow our political horizons to the same concep-
tual frameworks that have held American foreign policy captive since 1945.
The kind of humble reflexivity about the roots of our contemporary inter-
national order modeled by Rindzevičiūte. and every other author here does
a service to anyone trying to expand the pool of possible alternatives to our
present historical situation beyond the limited imaginations of today’s IR
punditry.
By collectively engaging the diverse complexity of twentieth-century
international thought and the ideological struggles that went into the con-
struction of IR’s “invented history,” Guilhot, Vitalis, Rosenboim, and Rin-
dzevičiūte. trouble contemporary truths about international order and
global governance. Vitalis’s and Rosenboim’s analyses reveal, for example,
how IR scholars did not always conceive of the world in state terms where
“domestic” and “foreign” affairs occupied discrete and unreachable
realms. They also demonstrate the way concerns about imperialism, geog-
raphy, and (for Vitalis) race permeated the earliest iterations of these
discourses. Rosenboim and Guilhot each stress the extent to which
democracy—in both its “domestic” and “foreign” contexts—was a source
of anxiety and promise for scholars in the postwar period and, in so doing,
suggest that it might be possible today to imagine democratic practice in a
global context differently. Both Rindzevičiūte. and Rosenboim locate unex-
pected sources of political and intellectual transformation within sites of
institutionalized, transnational power. Guilhot, by contrast, warns critics
against seeking political inspiration in the founding moments of a still pow-
erful contemporary discourse without adequately analyzing that discourse’s
connections to precisely the political phenomena these critics seek to tran-
scend. Finally, Vitalis demonstrates most clearly the political stakes
involved in allowing contemporary IR to deny its historical affiliations with
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racism and imperialism while also denying the contributions of those schol-
ars theorizing from the standpoint of America’s victims. In sum, all the
books discussed herein demonstrate the power of writing counter histories
in a “post-factual” age when most mainstream IR scholars can only
respond to the “Make America Great Again” movement by insisting upon
the purity of their own invented histories. In so doing, all four authors open
up new avenues for inquiry and suggest that a different global future is
possible.
University of Birmingham,
The Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
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